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(S. F. Nos. 17263, 17264. In Bank. Feb. 18, 1947.]

ROSEMARY PROPERTIES, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. CHARLES J. McCOLGAN, as Franchise
Tax Commissioner, ete., Appellant.
(Two Cases.)
[1] OorporatiolUl- I'ranchise 'lu - DeducttolUl- Dlvldendl.-In

the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tu Act, t 8(h), as
amended in 1937 (State. 1937, p. 2328; Deering's Gen. Laws,
1937, Act 8488), permitting a. deductioD of "dividends . . •
declared from income which has been included in the measure
of the tax . • 'I" the word "income" refers to gross income
subject to taxation by the state, from which it follows that
a dividend paid from "earnings ane! profits" attn'butable to
California sources woule! be deductible.
[2] Id. - Franchise 'lax - DeductiolUl- Divldends.-In the Bank
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, 18(h), as amended in
1939 (Stats. 1939, p. 2942; Deering's Gen. La'WS, 1939 Supp.,
Act 8488), permitting the deduction of dividmds declared
"from income which has. been taxed under the provisions of
the Corporation Tax Act of 1937 to the corporation declaring
the dividends," the word "income" is to be construed in the
same manner as the word in the 1937 amendment, as meaning
gross income.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Alameda County. Leon E. Gray, Judge. Affirmed.
Actions to recover additional franchise taxes paid under
protest. Judgments for plaintiff affirmed.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John L. Nourse and
James E. Sabine, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant.

Latham '" Watkins and Austin H. Peek, lr., for Respondent.
Mackay, McGregor'" Reynolds and Martin I. Wen, as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
[1] See 6A OaLJur. 1632.
Kelt. Die. Beference: [1, 2] Corporations, 1913.
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SPENCE, J.-Two actions were brought by plaintiff to
recover additional franchise taxes assessed by defendant
against plaintiff for the years 1938 and 1939, respectively.
They. were tried upon a stipulated set of facts, and they have
been briefed together on appeal in presenting a problem of
statutory construction affecting the propriety of a dividend
deduetion for franchise tax purposes for the two yea,rs in
question, under the terms of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act (Stats. 1929, ch. 13, p. 19; as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8488), hereinafter referred to a!il
"the act." The trial court entered a judgment in favor of
plaintiff in each case and from said judgments. defendant
has appealed.
Plainti1f, a California corporation, duly filed its franchise
tax returns for the years 1938 and 1939, the former based on
its 1937 income and the latter on its 1938 income. Plaintiff's
report of gross income for these successive years listed $76,195
and $83,545 as dividends paid to it respectively in 1937 and
1938 by the Ventura Land and Water Company, hereinafter
referred to as "Ventura." However, in computing its net
income for francht~ tax purposes for those years, plaintiff
deducted the full amount of the respective Ventura dividends
from its returns. As a result of that deduction and other deductions not here involved, plaintiff reported a net loss for
each year and paid a minimum tax of $25 on each of its returns as required by section 4(3) of the act.
Indue season defendant served notices on plaintiff of his
intention to assess an additional franchise tax for each of the
two years. Plaintiff protested the proposed assessments but
paid them with interest, after which these actions followed
to recover the additional assessments charged and collected by
defendant by reason of his adjustment of the Ventura dividend deduction taken by plaintiff on each of its returns. This
disputed item will determine whether or not plaintiff's franchise tax obligation for each of the two years exceeds the
minimum $25 assessment as originally reported. In order to
appraise the factors, in controversy, it is necessary to examine
the franchise tax returns filed by Ventura for the correspond.
ing years.
Ventura, a California corporation, conducted its entire business in this state. Its principal source of income was royalties from California oil and gas properties, which it owned
and leased to operating oil producers. Ventura's gross income
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for the year 1937-as reported on its 1938 return-was $1,203,295.60 and for the year 193"~ reported on its 1939 return
-was $1,417,090.48, of which sums $1,195,768.97 and $1,399,534.92 were derived, respectively, from its oil royalties. Prior
to 1937 Ventura had recovered in full its cost depletion for its
oil-bearing lands. But in pursuance of section 8(g) of the
act, which authorizes a deduction for depletion at the rate
of 27lh percent of the gross income from oil and gas wells, .
Ventura listed, and was allowed, on its respective returns n
deduction of $328,836.47 from its oil royalties for 1937 and
a deduction of $384.872.10 from its oil royalties for 1938.
These respective percentage depletions on its oil· royalties and
other allowable deductions reduced Ventura's net income for
franchise tax purposes for 1937 to $775,282.65 and for 1938
to $908,171.54. It was stipulated that Ventura's earnings and
profits for the year 1937 amounted to $963,338.63 and for the
year 1938 amounted to $1,112,147.82, from which sums came
the respective dividends of $76,195 and $83,545 paid plainti1f.
As the basis for the additional franchise tax assessments
against plaintiff, defendant claims that only 80.478 per cent
of the dividend paid in 1937 and 81.659 per cent of the dividend paid in 1938 were included in the measure of the tax
imposed by the act on Ventura. Defendant obtains these percentages by dividing Ventura's net income for the year in
question by its earnings and profits for the same period. The
two figures differ because of the factors taken into account:
thus, the oil depletion allowance which entered into the computation of Ventura's net income was a statutory percentage
deduction but such item did not affect Ventura's schedule of
earnings and profits since depletion sustained on a cost basis
had already been recovered in previous years; and disbursements such as those made for federal income tax and franchise tax charges. which reduced the amount of Ventura's
earnings and profits, did not affect the net income computation because not deductible under the act. (§ 8Cc),) Soaccording to defendant-Ventura's net income of $775,282.65
divided by its earnings and profits of $963,338.63 gives the
percentage of 80.478, which multiplied by plaintift's dividend
of $76,195 represents the proper dividend deduction to be
allowed plaintiff for 1937; and Ventura's net income of
$908,171.54 divided by its en1'Ilin~ and profits of $1,112.147.82
gives the percentage of 81.659, which multiplied by plaintiff's
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dividend of $83,545 represents the proper dividend deduction
to be allowed plaintiff for 1938.
Since plaintiff contends that the entire Ventura dividend
received in 1937 and 1938 was deductible for franchise tax
purposes in its respective returns as having been declared
by Ventura from income "included in the measure of the
tax" imposed by the act on Ventura, it is necessary to construe the language of the act to determine plaintiff's liability
for the additional taxes assessed and collected by defendant
under the above formula.
Section 4(3) requires that every corporation doing business within this state and not expressly exempted from taxation by the Constitution shall annually pay, for the privilege
of exercising its corporate franchise, lia tax according to or
measured by its net income, to be computed ••• at the rate
of four per centum upon the basis of its net income for the
next preceding fiscal or calendar year."
Section 7 defines "net income" as "gross income less the
deductions allowed." Section 8 enumerates the allowable
deductions. Among the items 80 listed is the dividend deduction under subdivision (h), the premise of the parties' eli&pute. Applicable to plaintiff's 1938 return is the provision
for the deduction in the subdivision as amended in 1937
(Stats. 1937, p. 2328): "Dividends received during the income year from a bank or corporation doing business in this
state declared from income which 1uu been incZuded in the
measure of the ta3: imposed by this act upon the bank or corporation declaring the dividends." (Italics ours.) Applicable to plaintiiI's 1939 return is the provision for the deduction in the subdivision as amended in 1939 (Stats. 1939,
p. 2942): "Dividends received during the income year declared from income which has been included in tM m6tJ.tUf'e
of the ta3: imposed by this act upon the bank or corporation
declaring the dividends, or from income which has been
taxed under the provisions of the Corporation Income Tax
Act of 1937 to the corporation declaring the dividcmds.".
(Italics ours.)
The import of the above italicized language carried into
the respective amendments of section 8(h) here applicable
is the pivotal point in controversy. Defendant's arguments
rest on these steps: (1) That under fundamental principles
of tax law as well as by statutory provision in the act itself
since 1939, dividends are defined to be "any distribution made
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by a corporation to its shareholders • • • out of its earnings
or prouts" (Stats. 1939, p. 2936, § 6(c) (1); 33 C.J. 303,
§ 78; Title 26, U.S.C.A., Internal Rev. Code, § 115}; (2)
that the "earnings or prouts" of a corporation are generally
not the same figure as its taxable net income because affected
by di1ierent considerations-the former by the corporation's
actusl expenditures, the latter by the allowable statutory deductions; (3) that since the 80urce of dividends is "earnings
or prouts," the word "income" as used in the allowable deduction of "dividends .•. declared from income which has
been included in the measure of the tax" means "earnings or
profits"; and 80 (4) where "earnings or prouts" exceed "net
income," then "it follows as a mathematical certainty that
dividends declared from such earnings or prouts are declared
from earnings or prouts which in part have not been included
in the measure of the tax and the dividends are not fully
deductible." Plaintiff does not dispute steps (1) and (2)
of defendant's argument, but it does challenge their relevancy
to the problem at hand and the logic of the concluding steps
(3) and (4) in limiting the phrase "income which has been
included in the measure of the tax" to mean no more than
statutory net income. Rather, 80 plaintiff contends, the
quoted phrase refers to "gross income subject to taxation by
the state"; and since that item would include "earnings and
profits" attributable to California sources, dividends paid
therefrom would be "declared from income which has been
included in the measure of the tax." A reasonable construction of the disputed language in relation to the basic concept
of the act sustains plaintiff's position.
[1] The tax in question is not one on income as such but
one which the corporation must pay "for the privilege of
exercising its corporate franchises within this state" (Matson
Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization. 3 Cal.2d 1, 11
[43 P.8d 805]) and "according to or measured by its net
income." (§ 4(3).} AB the nature of the tax is distinguished,
80 is its basis of calculation. Thus, the act uses the term "net
income" to specify the sum which, when multiplied by the
prescribed percentage rate, determines the amount of the
franchise tax. In this sense "net income," as defined by the
act, is the final measure by which the tax is computed. (San
Joaquin Ginning Co. v. McColgan, 20 Cal. 2d 254, 256 [125
P.2d 36].) Since "net income" means "gross income less
the deductions allowed" (§ 7), these factors neeessariq. enter
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into the computation and are included in the measure of
. the tax. The income involved is all income, including earnings and profits, attributable to California sourcesj the deductions, including the prescribed depletion rate of 27% per·
cent of gross income from oil and gas properties, are additional considerations. Following these principles, any dividend paid from "earnings and profits"-an item of gross
income entering, like the authorized deductions, into the determination of net income-would be a dividend paid out of
income included in the measure of the tax. As such the dividend is exempt from franchise tax in the hands of the recipient corporation.
This same conclusion was reached in the case of Burton
B. Green In.,utment Co. v. McColgan, 60 Cal.App.2d 224
[140 P.2d 451], with regard to a practically identical factual
situation involving the application of section 8{h) in its 1937
form. There the plaintiff taxpayer owned stock in Belridge
Oil Company, a California corporation which during the
year in question, 1937, derived all but a small portion of its
income from the production and sale of oil and gas in this
state. In its franchise tax return covering that year, Belridge Oil Company reported alZ its income and claimed the
oil depletion allowance under section 8{g), which percentage
depletion exceeded its actual cost depletion by a substantial
amount. During 1937 Be1ridge Oil Company had paid to
plaintiff certain dividends which plaintiff, in its appropriate
franchise tax return, included in its gross income and then
deducted under authority of section 8(h). In asserting an
additional assessment against plaintiff, defelldant tax commissioner took the position that "because the 271h per cent
of the gross income from the oil wells operated by Be1ridge
exceeded the depletion deduction based upon actual cost, the
excess of the deduction allowed over actUal cost depletion is
not a part of income which had been included in the measure
of the tax imposed, within the meaning of section 8{h)."
(60 Cal.App.2d 230-231.) In rejecting this theory, the court
said at pages 231-232: "If the total Belridge income for 1937
was included in its gross income for franchise tax purposes
and if out of its earnings of 1937 that corporation paid the
dividend in question to plaintiff out of profits earned in that·
year, it must follow that the entire dividend so paid to plaintiff was declared from income which had been included in
the measure of the tax. If it was, then it was deductible in
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full. The very purpose of section 8 subdivision (h) is to
avoid double taxation and thereby prevent the destruction
of capital assets. While it aims to tax all income received as
dividends (except those exempted by law) which have not
been taxed while in the treasury of the dividend payor, at the
same time it purposes to avoid the inclusion of the same income in the measure of the tax to be paid by two or more
different taxpayers. If the same dividend is included in the
measure of the tax paid by two taxpayers successively under
the Franchise Tax Act, the result is multiple taxtion."
Defendant attacks the pertinency of the Green Investment
Company ease because "it failed to take into consideration
whether the earnings or profits of the declaring corporation
out of which the dividends were declared were greater than
the net income by which the tax on the declaring corporation
had been measured." But such claim mistakenly assumes the
relationship between "earnings and profits" and "statutory
net income" to be a distinctive and controlling factor. In
fact, this ratio involves no different considerations than were
before the court in the Green Investment Company ease. It
simply rests on the theory that to the extent Ventura's dividends were declared from "earnings and profits" which exceeded in amount its "net income"--a difference wholly attributable to Ventura's taking of the oil and gas statutory
depletion allowance-such dividends were paid from an untaxed source, and so from income not "included in the measure of the tax." In the Green Investment Company case the
same point was considered as presented with relation to the
extent the statutory percentage depletion exceeded the cost
depletion and the consequent argument that "a portion of
the Belridge dividend was paid from an untaxed source."
In declaring this argument to be based upon a fallacious concept, the court aptly said at page 235: "Whether the amount
of net income for the purpose of computing the franchise tax
is increased or decreased by any adjustment which does not
at the same time proportionately enlarge or diminish profits,
it will not affect either the declaration of a dividend or the
amount thereof. • • . Since • . . all of the Belridge income
[including earnings and profits] was reported as gross income, all of its dividends were from a fund which had been
:flailed by the tax master," and therefore from "income which
has been included in the measure of the tax."
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The design of the act clearly contemplates the oil and gUlJ
percentage depletion (§ 8(g» and thedh'idcnd cieduction
(§ 8(h» as independent allowances to be taken by two sepa·
rate corporations in the computation of their respective net
incomes. Defendant attacks the propriety of a "percentage
depletion [which] can go on and on after cost ••• has been
completely recovered" by the oil operating company, but
that is not a matter to be considered here. The procedure
which defendant challenges is authorized by the act. Upon
such premise it would appear that if the percentage deple·
tion is properly deducted from gross income by the dividend
declaring company in computing its net income for franchise
tax purposes, it should not thereafter be assessed to the recipient corporation in the latter's computation. Rather. a.'J
the court succinctly stated in the Green Investment Company
ease at page 234, "the recipient is authorized to deduct the
dividend which has passed through the tax mill before its
.
distribution by the declaring corporation."
A consideration of the legislative history of section 8 (h)
lends additional force to plaintiff's position. As first enacted
in 1929 (Stats. 1929, p. 23), section 8(h) provided for the
deductibility of dividends "received during the taxable year
from income arising out of business done in this state." Thi~
was construed to mean that it did not require dividends to
arise out of business done in this state by the corporation
which declared the dividends. Consequently, the deduction
could be taken where the corporation paying the dividend
was a foreign corporation and did no business in the !!tl1te
but merely owned stock in corporations operating in Califor·
nia from which it received income. (Corporation of America
v. Johnson, 7 Ca1.2d 295, 299·300 [60 P.2d 417].) To correct
this situation, section 8(h) was amended in 1933 (Stats. 1933,
pp. 688-689) by adding the requirement that the declaring
corporation must have done business in this state. At the
same time there was inserted the further requirement that
the declaring corporation must have been constitutionally
taxable in this state. But the base of the deduction was still
whether the dividend was declared from income "arising out
of business done in this state." Under such statutory test,
it is apparent that the propriety of plaintiff's claim to the full
Ventura dividend deduction taken on its respective franchise
tax returns could not be questioned.
Then in 1937 section 8(h) was amended to incllH'te the
I language in question. In making the change the words "aris-
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ing out of business done in this state" were deleted and the
deduction of dividends was allowed when declared from income "which has been included in the measure of the tax
imposed by this act!' This new wording is significant in that
coincident with its adoption the following provisions were
eliminated from subdivisIon (h) as it read in 1933: (1) The
allocation allowance applicable where dividends were declared
from income "derived from business done within and without
this state"; and (2) the reference to the inapplicability of
the deduction to dividends paid by constitutionally tuGempt corporations. With its attention 80 foeused on the
eliminated provisions, the Legislature in the 1937 amendment
apparently considered them unnecessary in view of the new
wording, briefer in form, as expressive of the purpose of the
deduction to avoid double taxation. Thus the language "income which has been included in the measure of the tu" appears to have a definite connection with the problem of allocating income within and without the state; and appears to
refer to income attributable to California sources. Such view
of the 1937 amendment coincides With the original purpose
of the dividend deduction and with the natural import of the
words. (Of. Burton E. Green Investment Co. v. McColgan,
B'Upra, 60 Cal.App.2d 232-233.) The substituted language
furnishes no basis for assuming that it was intended thereby
to establish a new scheme of tax deduction dependent upon
a ratio between "earnings or profits" and "net income"-a
view which would require, as defendant concedes, the interpretation of the word "income" in the disputed phrase to
mean "earnings or profits." Such interpretation not only
creates a redundancy in that the word "dividend" itself implies a distribution from "earnings or profits," but it also
does violence to a cardinal principle of statutory construction
in assigning a forced and strained meaning to a word contrary to its common understanding. (Corbett v. Cham'ber.,
10f) Cal. 178, 180 [41 P. 873]; I" re Alpine, 203 Cal. 731, 737
[265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 1500]; County of Lo. Angeles v. Pris'bie, 19 Cal.2d 634, 642 [122 P.2d 526]; 23 CalJur. 749, § 124.)
Under such circumstances it is but reasonable to conclude
that had the Legislature intended to restrict the dividend
deduction solely to taxable net income, rather than to correlate it simply with ineome attributable to California sources,
language expressive of such material change of purpose would
have been adopted.
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Additional proof of the legislative intention is found in
section 9(d) which was also enacted in 1937 (Stats. 1937,
pp. 2329-2330) when the phrase "included in the measure
of the tax" first appeared in section 8(h). Thus, in computing net income, section 9(d) allowed no deduction for "any
amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable
to one or more classes of income not included in the measure
of the tax imposed by this act!' In 80 referring to income
which is excluded from the computation of the franchise tax,
the Legislature must have intended it in the sense of "gross
income," since deductions are not allocable to "net income,"
which ean only result after the appropriate deductions have
been taken. Speaking to this point, the court in the Green
Investment Company ease, supra, said at page 233: "In view
of the use of the word income in section 9 subdivision (d) in
the sense of gross income we are convinced that it has the
same significance in section 8 subdivision (h). The Legislature could not have intended to use a significant word in
two different senses in the same statute (Ra.nsome-Crummey
Company v. Woodhams, 29 Cal.App. 356 [156 P. 62]; Coleman v. Oakland, 110 Cal.App. 715 [295 P. 59].)"
[aJ Nor does a contrary purpose appear from the 1939
amendment of section 8(h) by the addition of language allowing the deduction where the dividends were declared "from
income which has been taxed under the provisions of the
Corporation Income Tax Act of 1937 to the corporation declaring the dividends." The Corporation Income Tax Act
(Stats. 1937, p. 2184, as amended; Deering'S Gen. Laws, 1937,
Act 84948,) supplements the Franchise Tax Act and is complementary thereto. (West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27
Ca1.2d 705, 708 [166 P.2d 861].) Manifestly, the purpose of
the 1939 amendment in the application of the dividend deduction was to place corporate stockholders of corporations
taxable under the Corporation Income Tax Act on an equal
basis with corporate stockholders of corporations taxable under
the Franchise Tax Act. Accordingly, the phrase "income
which has been included in the measure of the tax" for franchise tax purposes and "income which has been taxed under
the provisions of the Corporation Income Tax Act" should
be given consistent interpretation. Defendant argUes that
this is not possible unless the phrase in each ease refers to
"net income." The subject of the tax under the Corporation Income Tax Act is net income; under the Franchise Tax

I

Feb. 1947]

RosEMARY PROPERTIES, INO. tl.

McCOLGAN

687

[29 C.2d 677; 177 P.2d 757]

,I

·

f

Act, as previously noted, the subject of the tax is the privilege of exercising corporate franchises within this 8t11.te,
'and the final measure thereof is "net income." The rate of
tax is the same in both cases, 4 per cent of net income.
But notwithstanding this distinction in the nature of the
tax, once the taxpayer reports his gross income from California sources, whether for purposes of computation under
the Franchise Tax Act or the Corporation Income Tax
Act, all of that income "has passed through the tax mill"
-has, so to speak, been taxed. Under such circumstances
the 1939 amendment does not deflect from the propriety
of construing the word "income" as used in the correlated
references to mean "gross income."
Moreover, in considering these successive amendments the
force of the decision in the Green Investment Company ease
cannot be overlooked. The court there said: "Since the gross
income and specified deductions are the factors included in
arriving at the net income, the conclusion is unavoidable that
it is gross income that is included in the measure of the tax."
(60 Ca1.App.2d 233.) That ease was decided in August, 1943.
Since that time the Legislature has met on three occasions:
at special sessions in 1944 and' 1946, and at its regular biennial session in 1945, yet it has not amended section 8(h) of
the act to avoid the result of that decision. Notable at the
1945 session is its readoption of section 8(h) without the
slightest change in the language construed in the Green Investment Company ease. (Stats. 1945, p. 1791.) Such readoption of a statutory provision amounts to ratification of
the court's construction thereof. Speaking to this point, the
court said in Union Oil Associates v. Johnson, 2 Ca1.2d 727,
at pages 734-735 [43 P.2d 291, 98 A.L.R. 1499]: "It is a
cardinal principle of statutory construction that where legislation is framed in the language of an earlier enactment on
the same or an analogous subject, which has been judicially
construed, there is a very strong presumption of intent to
adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior
enactment." (See, also, Guardianship of Reynolds, 60 Cal.
App.2d 669, 675 [141 P.2d 498]; Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S.
144, 153 [44 S.Ot. 462, 68 L.Ed. 949]; Carroll Electric Co.
v. Snelling, 62 F.2d 413, 416.)
But of even greater significance in this connection is the
Legislature's direct refusal at the 1945 session to adopt an
amendment to section 8(h) designed to overcome the effect
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of the decision in the Green Investment Company ease. A&sembly Bill No. 912, introduced at that session for the purpose of amending various sections of the act in question, referred, among others, to section 8(h). After restating in subdivision (1) of that subsection the language of section 8(h)
as amended in 1939, "'pra. said Assembly Bill 912 significantly proposed the following addition: "(2) The portion of
the dividend deductible under subdivision (1) of Section
8(h) shall be determined by ascertaining the ratio which the
net income of the corporation declaring the dividend bears
to the earnings and profits of such corporation for the same
income year." Assembly Bill No. 913, introduced at the same
session for the purpose of amending various sections of the
Oorporation Income Tax Act, contained the same proposal
with reference to section 7 (h) of that act. so that the correlation in operation between that Act and the Franchise Tax Act
would continue. It is obvious that the proposed addition in
the pertinent sections of the two aets provided for the dividend deduction to be determined exactly in the manner in
which defendant seeks to have it computed here in the absence
of such provision. However. the Senate, upon recommendation of its Oommittee on Revenue and Taxation, amended
both Assembly bills and the proposed addition was stricken
in each ease. (Senate Journal, Fifty-sixth Session, p. 2635.)
In such form both bills were ultimately passed: Assembly
Bill No. 912 became chapter 946 of the 1945 laws (Stats. 1945,
p. 1779) and Assembly Bill No. 913 became chapter 859 of
the 1945 laws (Stats. 1945, p. 1572). Such action of the Legislature forcefully demonstrates that it appreciated that a
substantial change in the wording of section 8 (h) would be
required to effect a different basis for allowance of the dividend deduction as previously provided and construed; and
that it decided to adhere to the premise of the Green Investment Oompany ease in the construction of said section.
For these reasons we conclude that plaintiff was entitled to
deduct the Ventura dividend in full on its respective franchise tax returns covering its 1937 and 1938 income.
The judgments are, and each of them is, aftlrmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., concurred..
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The allowance of the deduction in section 8(h) of the Bank
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act is designed solely to pre-
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vent double taxation of corporate income by this state. This
section was drafted to cover dividends generally; it was not
aimed particularly at dividends declared out of earnings or
profits not included in the measure of the tax because of the
percentage depletion deduction. Dividends out of earnings
or profits not included in the measure of the tax on the
dividend-declaring corporation because of the percentage depletion deduction are on the same footing as any other dividends out of earnings or profits not included in the measure
of the tax on such corporation. Earnings or profits may be
excluded from the measure of the tax for a variety of reasons
other than the percentage depletion deduction. They may
represent income earned by the dividend-declaring eorporation from business outside of this state; they may have been
accumulated before the effective date of the act; they may have
been declared by a corporation not taxable under the Bank
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act. Whatever the reason
earnings or profits of the dividend-declaring corporation are
not included in the measure of the tax on such corporation, a
recipient corporation cannot deduct dividends declared out
of such earnings or profits, for the deduction is expressly
limited to dividends declared out of income that was included in the measure of the tax.
If all of the net income of a corporation is derived from
business in California, and all of its earnings or profits are included in the measure of the tax, all dividends declared out of
such earnings or profits will be deductible by the recipient
corporations. The same income would be taxed twice if it
were included in the measure of the tax on the dividenddeclaring corporation and included again in the measure of the
tax on the recipient corporations. If none of the income of the
dividend-declaring corporation is included in the measure of
the tax on such corporation, none of its dividends will be
deductible by the recipient corporations. Thus the dividenddeclaring corporation may be a foreign corporation that does
no business in California and is not subject to the act; it may
be a Federal Reserve Bank not subject to state taxation; it
may be an insurance company not subject to taxation on or
measured by net income; it may have earned the income in
question before the effective date of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act.
The income of the dividend-dee1aring corporation may be
derived in part from business carried em outside the state.
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Income from out of state business is not included in the measure of the tax and consequently dividends representing such
income are not deductible by the recipient corporations.
The deduction is allowed only when the earnings or profits
out of which the dividends are declared have been included
in the measure of the tax on the corporation declaring the
dividends. For example: X Corporation, which derives all
its income from business done in this state, declares a dividend
from its earnings or profits to Y, a foreign corporation not
subject to the act, which in turn, out of the money received
declares a dividend to Z, which is taxable under the act. Since
the earnings 01' profits from which the dividend was declared
by Y was not included in the measure of a tax under the
Act on Y, the dividend is not deductible by Z. Even if Y
did business in California, and was therefore taxable under
the act, Z could not deduct the dividend, since the earnings
or profits from which the dividend was declared would not
be included in the measure of the tax on Y because the dividend would be deductible by Y under section 8(h).
A dividend may be declared by a foreign corporation that
operates an oil well outside this state and does no business
here. It may have no net income for purposes of taxation,
:md ~-et have earnings or profits for dividend purposes. A
('J.lltornia corporation receiving such a dividend could not
(~cJuet the amount thereof under section 8(h), for the earn~.'.;s 01' profits out of which it was declared were not included
;,1 U~e mcasure of the tax by this state on the dividend-dee1ar:1lJ' corporation. The result would be no different if the
l~iv;d;;!ll1-decl:ll'ing corporation were a California corporation
operating its oil well in this state. Since it would have no
11et in~ome under the act, it would pay the minimum tax
of $25. Yet it would have earnings or profits from which
to declare dividends to its shareholders. Such dividends
would 110t be deductible for the reason that prevails in all
C:::tses in which dividends are not deductible, namely, the
eamings or profits out of which the dividends are declared
would not be included in the measure of the tax on the
uividcnd-declaring corporation.
In the foregoing example, the dividend-declaring corporation had no net income. The principle that the deduction is
allowed only to the extent necessary to prevcnt double taxation by this state is equally applicable when the dividend··
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declaring corporation has net income. Thus a California on
company after deducting percentage depletion, may have net
income for tax purposes of $500,000 but earnings or profits
of $1,000,000 for dividend distributions. If the earnings or
profits are distributed as a dividend to a California corpora~
tion, only one-half of the dividend will be deductible, since
the measure of the tax on the dividend-declaring corporation
will include only one·half of the earnings or profits out of
which the dh"idend is declared.
In the present cases, the earnings or profits from which
the dividends were declared likewise exceeded the net income
by which the tax on the dividend~eclaring corporation was
measured, and there has obviously been no tax measured by
such excess. To the extent they represent such excess,
dividends cannot be deducted without defeating the pur·
pose of section 8 (h) to limit the deduction to the extent
necessary to prevent double taxation.
Not only the purpose of section 8(h) but its express provisions preclude a deduction in their entirety of the dividends
in question. Section 8(h) as amended in 1937 provides:
"Section 8: In computing 'net income' the following deduction shall be allowed: .•• (h) Dividends received dur~
ing the income year from a bank or corporation doing busi~
ness in this State declared from income which has been
included in the measure of the tax imposed by this Act
upon the bank or corporation declaring the dividend." In
1939 the Legislature added the following to section 8(h):
"or from income which has been taxed under the provi.
sions of the Corporation Income Tax Act of 19371 to the
corporation declaring the dividends."
The purpose of this provision can be grasped only if its
terms are understood. The "measure of the tax imposed by
this Act" is net income. (§§ I, 2, 4.) "Net income" is defined in section 7 of the act to mean "gross income" as de~
fined in section 6, less the deductions provided for in section 8.
"Dh"idends" mean "any distribution made by a corporation
to its shareholders . . . out of its earnings or profits. . . ....
lThe Corporation Income Tax Act supplements the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act and imposes a tax on the net income of certain
corporations not subject to the latter act. (Bee West Publishing Co. v.
McColgan, 27 Cal.2d 705, 708 [166 P.2d 861].)
lIThis aefinition was added in 1939. The Franchise Tax Commissioner,
following the federal income tax law on which the state act is bn~ed,
ascribed the same meaning tc> the term "dvidend" in the administration
of the act before thia definition wu added.
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(§ 6(e) (1).) "Earnings or profits," generally speaking,
mean gross receipts less the expense of producing them.
(Weyerhaeuser, 33 B.T.A. 594, 597; Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284,
287.) Since dividends are declared, not from statutory
gross income or statutory net income, but from earnings or
profits, and only from earnings or profits, the word "income" in the phrase "Dividends . • .' declared from income
• • ." necessarily means earnings or profits.
Since net income (statutory gross income less statutory deductions) and earnings or profits (gross receipts less the expense of producing them) are computed difEerently, they will
usually not be the same. If the earnings or profits exceed net
income, it follows 88 a mathematical certainty that part of
the earnings or profits have not been included in the measure
of the tax and that the dividends declared out of such earnings or profits are not fully deductible.
The following illustrations, cited by defendant, show the
difference between net income and earnings or profits and
demonstrate that dividends may be declared from earnings
or profits that have not been included in the measure of the
taL A domestic corporation, engaged in activities solely
within this state, receives gross income of $100,000 and pays
salaries amounting to $40,000, rent amounting to $25,000 and
federal income taxes amounting to $15,000. For purposes
of computing earnings or profits all of these items are taken
into consideration, but for purposes of computing net income,
federal income taxes are not, since they are not deductible
under the act. Thus we have the following comparison:

I

,I

11a1"3i1l.g' or Profit.
Net 111.COme
Gross
Gross
Income
$100,000
Income
$100,000
Minus
Minus
Salaries $40,000
Salaries $40,000
Rent
25,000
Bent
25,000 65,000 i
Federal
Income
Taxes
15,000 80,000

----

Earnings
or profits

$20,000

$35,000

In the foregoing illustration, the statutory net income is
greater than the earnings or profits because federal income
taxes are not deductible in eomputins net iDeome. Since the

.
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net income includes all the earnings and profits (it even
exceeds them), any dividends declared out of such earnings
or profits will represent income included in the measure of
the tax, and will thercJfore be fully deductible. The reverse
may be true. Suppose the same facts as above except that
the corporation engages in activities both within and without the state and that under an appropriate allocation formula only 30 per cent of its net income is attributable to
this state. The comparison would then be:
Earnings or profits

$20,000

Total Net Income
$35,000
Net income attributable to California
80%
$10,500

In the foregoing nlusb'ation the earnings or profits are
greater than the net income by which the tax is measured
because net income not attributable to California is excluded from the measure of the tax. Dividends declared
out of earnings or profits representing such income will
therefore not be deductible.
Similarly, dividends declared out of earnings or profits
excluded from the measure of the tax by virtue of the deduction for percentage depletion are not deductible. It makes
no difference whether percentage depletion is allowed as an
exemption, an exclusion from gross income, or as a deduction
from gross income. Income representing the allowance for
depletion is as efi'ectively excluded from the measure of the
tax by way of deduction as it would be by way of an exemption or exclusion from gross income. The figure that is left
after the deductions are taken is net income. That part of
the gross income accounted for by deductions cannot possibly be included in net income, for the deductions exclude
the amount thereof from the net income. Most of the deductions will represent outlays made in earning the gross income,
and since such outlays cannot be the source of dividends, no
problem with respect thereto can arise under section 8(h).
The problem presented in the instant cases can arise only
when the item deducted is itself income that is part of the
corporation's earnings and profits. When the deduction for
depletion represents a return of the corporation's capital, any
dividend distribution represented by the amount of such deduction would be a return of capital to the shareholders and
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would lower the basis of the stock for computing gain or loss.
If the depletion allowance does not rcpresent a return of
capiro) it can only represent earnings and profits (See Rudick,
"Dividcncl.9" and "Earnings or P"o/ifs" Under the lncorne
Tax Law, 89 U. of PaL.Rev., 865, 866; 1 Mertens' Law of Federal Income Taxation, 472; Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284; Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.1115-3.) that are not included in the measure of the
tax. Since such earnings and profits are not included in the
corporation's net income and therefore not included in the
measure of the tax, dividends declared therefrom do not meet •
the requirements of section 8(h) as dividends "declared from
income which has been included in the measure of the tax."
Suppose a domestic eorporation is engaged in activities
solely within this state. Suppose further that it receives gross
income in the amount of $130,000, including royalties from
oil and gas wells in the amount of $100,000, and that the
eorporation pays salaries of $40,000, and that it does not
have any eost depletion but takes a deduction for depletion
equal to 27% per cent of the $100,000, or $27,500. The
eomparative eomputations would then be:

Earnings or Profits
Gross
Income
$130,000
Minus
Salaries $40,000
n~nt
25,000

Federal
Income
Taxes
Earnings
or profits

I

I

,

Percentage
Depletion
15,000

27,000

92,500

80,000
$50,000

Net Income

$37,500

In this illustration nothing is subtracted for depletion in
computing earnings or profits because there was no depletion
cost, and nothing is subtracted for federal income taxes in
computing net income because the act does not provide for a
deduction for federal income taxes. On the other hand, federal income taxes are subtracted in computing earnings or
profits because they are an expense, and percentage depletion
is deducted in computing net income because the act provides
for such a deduction. In this illustration the earnings or i
profits exceed the net income by $12,500, and it is mathematical1¥ impossible for aueb excess to be included in the DDt iD-

.
.

Net Income
Gross
Income
$1.30,000
Minus
Salaries $40,000
Rent
25,000
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come. Consequently, dividends cannot be deducted to the
extent they are declared out of such excess.
In the present cases, the "net income" of the Ventura
Land and Water Company (hereinafter called "Ventura")
for tax purposes for the year 1937 was $775,282.65. It was
stipulated that the earnings or profits of Ventura for that
year were $963,338.63. The two figures differ for the following reasons: The "earnings or profits" were not reduced
on account of cost of depletion because there was none, but
in computing "net income," $328,836.47 was deductible as
percentage depletion, because this deduction was provided
for by statute. On the other hand, Ventura had outlays of
$110,372.58 for federal income taxes, $30.157.90 for California
franchise tax and $250 as nondeductible contributions, all of
which served to reduce Ventura's "earnings or profits," because they constituted expenses, but none of which was deductible in computing "net income" for franchise tax purposes, because the act does not provide for such deductions.
Thus, although Ventura's "net income" for franchise tax purposes for the income year 1937 was $775.282.65, its "earnings
or profits" (the fund available for distribution of dividends)
for that year amounted to $963.338.63. or $188,055.98 more
than its net income. The excess for 1938 was $203,976.28.
& in the preceding example, it is mathematically impossible
for the earnings or profits in excess of the net income to be
included in the net income. Consequently, at least to the
extent the dividends represent such excess, they are not
deductible.
Plaintiff contends, and the majority opinion sustains the
contention, that the phrase "income which has been included
in the measure of the tax" refers to "gross income subject to
taxation by the state" and since that item would include earnings and profits attributable to California sources, dividends
paid therefrom would be "declared from income which has
been included in the measure of the tax. t,
The Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act imposes a tax
"according to or measured by net income." (§§ 1,2,4.) How
could the Legislature state in plainer terms that "net income"
is the measure of the tax 7 In the light of this language how
can it be seriously contended that the measure of the tax is
"gross income subject to taxation' by the state7" Plaintiff
confuses the measure of t.he tax with its computation. It is
true that gross income is a necessary factor in computing net
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income. So are the deductions allowed, but that does not make
them the measure of the tax. Any gross income that remains
after deductions are taken is included in the measure of the
tax, but it is logically and mathematieal1y impossible for any
fgrosB income that is represented by such deductions to be
included therein. In concrete figures, plaintiff's contention
amounts to saying that if a corporation has gross income of
$100,000 and is allowed deductions of $50,000, leaving a net
.income of $50,000, then the whole $100,000 has been included
in the net of $50,000.
Any possible doubt that section 8(h) requires the source of
the dividend to be included in the net income of the dividend
declaring corporation has been dispelled by the 1939 amendment adding the phrase "or from income which has been taxed
under the provisions of the Corporation Income Tax Aet of
1937 to the corporation declaring the dividends." The purpose of this amendment is to place corporate shareholders of
corporations taxable under the Corporation Income Tax Act
i>n an equal footing with corporate shareholders of corporations taxable under the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax
Act. The two acts are complementary. (See West Publishing
Co. v. McColgan, 27 Ca1.2d 705, 708 [166 P.2d 861].) The rate
of tax is the same and the provisions for the two acts are
correlated. The essential difference between them is that in
the former the subjeet of the tax is net income, in the latter
the subject of the tax is the privilege of doing business in this
state in corporate form, and net income is the measure of the
tax. Since the Corporation Income Tax Act is imposed directly on net income, the 1939 amendment does not use the
phrase "income included in the measure of the tax." Had the
Legislature intended the phrase as used with respect to
corporations subject to the Bank and Corporation Franchise
Tax Act to mean gross income it would have provided in the
1939 amendment for the deduction of dividends declared from
gross income rather than from income taxed under the Corporation Income r,rax Act.
Assume for the purposes of argument that "income" as
used in section 8(h) means "gross income" as plaintiff contends. Section 8(h) would then be construed as if it read,
"Dividends received during the income year declared from
gross income which has been included in the measure of the
tax." Even this construction would not support plaintiff's
contention, for the section would still contain the qualifying
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phrase, "which has been included in the measure of the to"
a phrase that recognizes unequivocally that not all "gross income" is included in the measure of the to.
Only if all gross income is included in the measure of the
tax ean plaintUf's contention be sustained. In the foregoing
discussion it has been demonstrated that when the earnings or
profits out of which dividends have been declared exceed the
statutory net income of the dividend-deelaring corporation, it
is mathematically impossible for all of the iross income to be
included in the measure of the tax on such corporation. Confusing net income with the process of computing it, plaintUf
contends that all gross income is included in the measure of
the to because it is "income which has been taken into account" or "income which has been through the to mill" or
"income which has been 1lailed by the tax master." This contention would render meaningless the limitation of the deduction to "dividends declared from income which has been included in the measure of the tax," for the gross income of all
corporations taxable under the act is "taken into aeeount" or
goes "through the to mill" or is "1lailed by the tax master."
Accordingly, dividends declared by such corporations would
be deductible in their entirety. Thus the entire gross income
of a corporation doing business within and without this state
is "taken into account" in computing its tax. The corporation
is required to report its gross income from all sources, both
within and without the state, and the net income that is arrived at after taking the statutory deductions is allocated part
to this state and the remainder to the other states, usually by
means of a formula. (Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d
664 [111 P.2d 334]; 315 U.S. 501 [62 S.Ot. 701, 86 L.Ed.
991].) Thus, for purposes of illustration, suppose a corporation that does business in California and in other states has a
total gross income from all its business for a particular year of
$1,000,000, earnings or profits of $800,000, and net income of
$600,000, of which $60,000 is attributable to California. If the
corporation then pays out the entire $800,000 of earnings or
profits as dividends to California corporations whose only
activities were in this state, the view that all amounts that
have been taken into account as "gross income" have thereby
been included in the measure of the tax would mean that the
California corporations receiving these dividends amounting
to $800,000 could deduct them in their entirety although the
corporation declaring the dividends had only paid a to
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measured by $600,000. Certainly no such result is necessary
to avoid double taxation by this state, andplainti1f concedes that such dividends would not be fully deductible. Yet
such dividends meet the conditions urged by plaintiff for
the deduction of the dividends in question, for all the gross
income of the dividend-declaring corporation was "taken into
account," "went through the tax mill" and was "flailed by
the tax master."
Plaintiff's suggestion that the disputed phrase in section
8(h) should be interpreted to mean "gross income attributable
to California sources" is not only administratively unworkable but is inconsistent with the basic structure of the act.
With respect to a corporation doing business within and
without the state, the act provides, not for the ascertainment of
the gross income attributable to this state, but for the ascertainment of the net income attributable to this state. Such
a corporation is required to report its gross income from all
sources within and without the state; all applicable deductions
are taken, and the total net income is determined. Part of this
total is then allocated to this state. Ordinarily, in the cases of
businesses conducted within and without the state there is no
feasible way of determining what part of the gross income or
of the deductions is attributable to this state. Consequently,
the act provides for a determination of the amount of net
income earned by the business as a whole and then for an
allocation of part of that income to this state.
It is contended that it is anomalous for the Legislature to
allow oil companies a deduction for depletion that is more than
sofIicient for a recovery of costs and then in effect to nullify
the tax savings derived by the dividend-declaring corporation
from percentage depletion by denying their corporate shareholders a deduction for dividends out of earnings or profits
represented by the depletion deduction. The extent to which
income is taxed and the extent to which deductions are anowed
is entirely a matter of legislative discretion so long as constitutional restrictions are observed. The Legislature has seen
fit to allow a deduction for depletion in the terms prescribed.
It has also seen fit to deny a deduction for dividends unless
double taxation by this state would result. Whether it was
wise for the Legislature to do either of these things is of no
concern here. The Legislature has not cbosen, as it could have,
to require domestic corporations to include their entire net
income, including income from out-of-state business, in the
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measure of the tax. Yet it denies corporate shareholders of
such corporations a deduction for dividends declared out of
earnings or profits from out-of-state business, and the very
reason it does so is that such earnings or profits are not included in the measure of the tax on the dividend-declaring
corporation. There is no more reason to grant corporate shareholders of oil companies a deduction for dividends out of
earnings or profits excluded from the measure of the tax on
such companies by way of the deduction for percentage depletion than there would be to grant corporate shareholders of
domestic corporations a deduction for dividends declared
from earnings or profits excluded from the measure of the tax
on such corporations because derived from out-of-state business. In each case the recipient corporations are denied the
deduction because the tax savings allowed the dividenddeclaring corporation preclude double taxation by this state.
Section 3 of the Corporation Income Tax Act provides:
"provided, however, that the income of any corporation which
is included in the measure of the tax imposed by the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act, Statutes 1929, Chapter 13,
as amended, shall not be subject to the tax imposed by this
act. • . ." Plaintiff contends that if the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act applies, the Corporation Income Tax
Act does not apply and that since this is the clear meaning of
section 3 it follows that the phrase "included in the measure
of the tax" in section 3 of the Corporation Income Tax Act
must mean gross income from California sources. The purpose of the Corporation Income Tax Act is to prevent discrimination against corporations subject to the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act. Since the subject of the tax
in the latter act is the privilege of exercising corporate franchises in this state, decisions of the United States Supreme
Court prevent its application to foreign corporations engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce. (See cases cited in West
Publishing 00. v. McOolgan, 27 Ca1.2d 705, 708 [166 P.2d
861].) A tax on the net income of such corporations, however,
is valid, and the Corporation Income Tax Act imposes such a
tax. (Ibid. p. 709, West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328
U.S. 823 [66 s.Ot. 1378, 90 L.Ed. 1603].) In order to avoid
any suggestion of discrimination against interstate commerce
the act was made applicable to the income of all corporations
derived from sources within this state, including the income
of corporations taxable under the Bank and Corporation
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Franchise Tax Act. In order to prevent discrimination against
corporations taxable under the latter act by the imposition of
a double tax burden thereon, section 3 of the Corporation
Income Tax Act was added to exempt the income included in
the measure of the tax on such corporations. If that were the
only exemption provision in the Corporation Income Tax Act,
other income, such as income from out-of-state business, from
dividends for which a deduction is allowed, and income represented by the depletion deduction would be taxable under the
Corporation Income Tax Act. That act, however, contains
other provisions identical with provisions of the Bank and
Corporation Franchise Tax Act that allow a deduction for
dividends (§ 7 (h» and percentage depletion (§ 7 (g» and that
exclude income from out-of-state business. (§ 3, 13.) Thus the
exemption of such income in the Corporation Income Tax Act
arises because of specific provisions of that act and not from
any theory that gross income is included in the measure of the
Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax within the meaning of
section 3 of the Corporation Income Tax Act.
A comprehensive tax statute such as the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act exemplifies intricate draftmanship;
it evolves out of the painstaking deliberations and studies not
only of public officials but of others interested in tax legislation. Such a statute, wrought from a consideration of many
con1licting interests, cannot long retain unity and coherence if
one section or another is refabricated by the courts without
regard for the structural whole. The technical concepts of the
statute, its express provisions, should not lightly be vitiated
by facile phrases such as "gone through the tax mill" or
"flailed by the taxmaster" that denote a lack of insight into
the legislative purpose that binds together the provisions
of the statute. If the express words of the statute are overridden by such phrases neither taxpayers nor tax officials
can look to the written word of the statute for its authentiQ
meaning, and the already difficult task of understanding the
revenue acts becomes hopeless.
The majority opinion relies heavily on the case of Burton
E. Green Investment Co. v. McColU(J"'. (60 Cal.App.2d 224
[140 P.2d 451], petition for hearing denied by this court.)
That case unquestionably supports plaintiff's contentions, but
in my opinion it was erroneously decided and should be disapproved. It is contended, however, that section 8(h) was not
,amended at the regular session or the two special sessions of
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the Legislature after the decision in that ease, that in 1945 a
Senate committee rejected a proposed amendment providing
that dividends were deductible only in the ratio of the dividend-declaring corporation's earnings or profits to its net
income, and that therefore the Legislature adopted the court's
construction of the act in the Green ease. The opinion in the
Green case, however, contains 80 many errors fundamentally
at variance with many provisions of the act that the Legislature cannot reasonably be presumed to have adopted the construction of the act in that case. These errors will bebriefiy
described.
(1) The court in the Green case states (60 Cal.App.2d 224,
231) that net income "does not constitute the 'measure of the
tax.' The income included in the measure of the tax is all
income." These statements repudiate the following express
provisions of the act: "Every national banking association
located within the limits of this State shall annually pay to the
State a tax according fo or measured by it$ ft.ef income, to be
computed, in the manner hereinafter provided, upon the basis
of its Mf income for the next preceding :fiscal. or ealendar
year.•.. " (§ 1; italics added.) "Every bank, other than a
national banking association, located within the limits of this
State, shan annually pay to the State, for the privilege of
exercising its corporate franchises within this State, a tax
according to or measured by its ft.et income, to be computed, in
the manner hereinafter provided, upon the basis of its ft.ef
ift.come for the next preceding fiscal or ealendar year. • • !'
(§ 2; italics added.) "Every financial corporation doing business within the limits of this State ••• shall annually pay to
the State, for the privilege of exercising its corporate franchises within this State, a tax GCCOrdift.g fo or measured by its
ft.ef income, to be computed, in the manner hereinafter provided, upon the basis of its ft.ef income. •••" (§ 4(1) ; italics
added.} "With the exception of financial corporations, every
corporation doing business within the limits of this State ..•
shan annually pay to the State, for the privilege of exercising
its corporate franchises within this State, a tax occordift.g fo
or measured by its ft.ef ift.COme, to be computed in the manner
hereinafter provided, • • • upon the basis of its ft.et income
for the next preceding fiscal or calendar year••••" (§ 4(3) ;
italics added.) If the income included in the measure of the
tax were all income, as the court in the Green case states it is,
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the tax on national banks would be invalid under section 5219
of the United States Revised Statutes, for, while that section
authorizes a tax on national banks according to or measured
by their net income, it does not authorize a tax measured by all
their income. Can it reasonably be contended that the Legislature adopted a construction that would not only repudiate
express provisions of the act but invalidate the tax on national banks!
(2) The court in the Green case states (60 Ca1.App.2d 224,
233), that proof of the legislative intention is to be found in
section 9(d), which was also enacted in 1937. That section
provides: "In computing net income no deduction shall be
allowed for: ••• (d) Any amount otherwise allowable as a
deduction which is allocable to one or more classes of income
not included in the measure of the tax imposed by this act."
The court states that the word "income" is used in section
9(d) in the sense of "gross income" and that the word "income" in section 8(h) must have been used in the same sense.
Why must it! The two sections serve difl'erent purposes and
there is no necessary relation between them. Assume, however,
for the purpose of argument, that the word "income" means
"gross income" in both sections. The court also states (60
Cal.App.2d 224, 231) that all income is included in the
measure of the tax. Yet section 9 (d) specifically refers to
"classes of income which have not been included in the measure
of the tax. •.•" U all income is included in the measure of
the tax, as the court says it is, how can there be classes of
income that have not been included in the measure of the tad
The court's reasoning renders section 9(d) meaningless, for,
if, as the court says, all income is included in the measure of
the tax, there would never be a case in which items of income
had not been included in the measure of the tax, and hence,
there never would be a case in which any amount was allocable
to one or more classes of income not included in the measure
of the tax.
In section Sed) the Legislature was not concerned with the
question whether the classes of income referred to were either
"gross income" or "net income." There are several reasons
why a class of income may not have been included in the
measure of the tax: it may be a class of income that has been
excluded from the statutory definition of gross income, e. g.
amounts received under life insurance policies (§ 6(b» ; it
may be a class of income, which., although required to be re-
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ported in gross income is fully deductible, such 88 income from
business activities of certain types of corporations (§§ 8(1)
and S(m» ; or it may be a class of income that is allocated to
other states because it is derived from sources outside this
state, e. g. income from intangibles having a situs outside the
state. (§ 10.)
(3) The court in the Green case states (60 Ca1.App.2d 224,
235) that "the Act makes no provision for computing depletion on the basis of cost." This statement is ettoneous. Section
8(g) of the act as amended in 1937 incorporated by reference
the provisions of section 113 and 114 of the federal Revenue
Act of 1936. Since 1939 these provisions have been set forth
in full in the California Act. Under these provisions, a deduction may be taken for either cost depletion or percentage depletion, whichever is greater. Hence, if cost depletion exceeds
percentage depletion a deduction for cost depletion may be
taken. Certainly, the Legislature did not adopt a construction
of the act that repudiates 80 vital a provision.
(4) The court in the Green case erroneously assumed that
percentage depletion represents an exhaustion of capital and
that the dividends were fully deductible to prevent a tax on
capital. The court states (60 Cal.App.2d 224, 234) that
"Whatever method of computing depletion be followed • • •
the purpose is to leave in the hands of the taxpayer unappropriated that portion of the cost attributable to the amount of
capital exhausted in earning the income on which any variety
of tax is to be paid. • • . In view of the extreme difficulty of
devising a precise formula . . . it was obviously determined
that depletion based on a percentage of the gross income from
the mineral or oil deposit must closely approximate the actual
physical exhaustion.••. If it represents a positive exhaustion
of capital it should be deducted by the owner of the property
88 a method of avoiding the exhaustion of capital. If it is
properly deducted in computing the oil operator's income for
dividend purposes it should not thereafter be charged to the
recipient corporation in computing his income for franchise
tax purposes. To avoid such a hardship the recipient is authorized to deduct the dividend.•. !'
The foregoing statement is in error on at least three counts:
(a) Percentage depletion does not necessarily represent an
exhaustion of capital. "Percentage depletion is not based on
cost and in many eases taxpayers recover tax free by way of
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percentage depletion far in excess of the cost of their oil
properties.•••" (Estate of Japhet, 3 Tax Court 86.) The
percentage depletion deduction may continue, as here, after
cost or capital invested has been eompletely recovered. Thus,
in the present eases Ventura had deductions of $328,836.47 and
$384,872.10 for percentage depletion in the two years here
involved. It is stipulated that Ventura fully recovered its cost
or capital in prior years. Therefore, there can be no question
of "invasion of capital" since Ventura has completely recovered its capital investment in prior years. There also was
no question of invasion of capital in the Green ease.
(b) Percentage depletion in excess of cost depletion is not
deductible in computing earnings or profits for dividend purposes. (Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284; Wood, 3 T.C. 187; see, Rudick,
"DWide1Uls" and "Earnings Of' Profits" under The Income
Tax Law, 89 U.ofPa.L.Rev., 865, 886; 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation 472.) Plaintiff in the present eases recognized this and stipulated to the computations of "earnings or
profits" for the years involved. These computations plainly
show that percentage depletion in excess of cost depletion is
not a deductible item in computing the fund available for
dividends.
(c) If a corporate distribution is a "dividend" within the
meaning of the act, then necessarily no element of capital can
be present in the distribution. "Dividends" are specifically
defined in the act (§ 6 (1» as distributions ont of earnings
or profits. In computing "earnings or profits" available for
dividends, a deduction for cost depletion is always allowed as
long as there is any cost to be recovered. Any distribution out
of capital would not be a "dividend" because it would not be
made out of earnings or profits. If a distribution is made out
of capital it does not constitnte a dividend and the recipient
cannot claim a deduction for it under section 8(h), which
permits a deduction only for dividends. A distribution out of
capital reduces the basis for tax purposes of the stock held by
recipients of the distribntion, but cannot constitute a dividend.
Since a dividend is defined as a distribution out of "earnings
or profits," it follows that any corporate distribution that
constitutes a dividend cannot represent an invasion of capital.
The distributions in the Green ease were admitted to be
dividends. Hence the conclusion of the court that a deduction
of the Belridge dividends was necessary to prevent a tax on
capital was clearly in error•

.
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(5) The court in the Green case erroneously stated (60
Cal.App.2d 224, 233), that the 1937 amendment to section
8 (h) was not intended to alter its meaning as expressed in
1933. A comparison of the amended sections and a list of the
changes effected will show the extent of the court's error.
Section 8(h) as amended in 1933 (Stats. 1933 ch. 209) provided: "In computing 'net income' the following deductions
shall be allowed: (h) Dividends received during the taxable
year from a bank or corporation doing business in this State
declared from income arising out of business done in this
state: . • • The provisions of this subsection shall not apply
to dividends received from corporations not taxable under
article thirteen of the Constitution of this State. • ••" Seetion 8 (h) as amended in 1937 provided: "Dividends received
during the income year from a bank or corporation doing
business in this State declared from income which has been included in the measure of the tax imposed by this act upon the
bank or corporation declarin/l the dividends." The most
obvious change made by the 1937 amendment was to restrict
the deduction to dividends declared by corporations taxable
under the act, as contrasted with the 1933 section. which permitted the deduction as long as the declarer corporation was
doing business in the state and was subject to tax under
article XIII of the Constitution. Thus, for example, dividends
from insurance companies would be deductible under the 1933
act, but not under the 1937 act. Another obvious change was
the restriction of the dividend deduction to distributions from
income that had been included in the measure of the tax imposed upon the corporation declaring the dividends. The insertion of this restriction was prompted by the decision in
Corpora.tion of America v. Johnson, 7 Cal.2d 295 (60 P.2d
417], which interpreted the language "income arising out of
business done in this State," which appeared in the 1929 version of section 8 (h) as not restricted to income from business
done by the corporation declaring the dividends. Since the
same phrase "income arising out of business done in this
State" was present in the 1933 provisions of section 8(h) presumably the rule of the Corporation of America case applied to
it except as restricted by other conditions in the 1933 act.
The plaintiff seeks to dismiss these errors as "rhetorical
imperfections." They cannot be dismissed 80 lightly, for they
a9 C.2cl-2J
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were the very premises on which the court based its interpretation of the statute. This court's denial of a hearing in the
Green ease does not constitute approval of the propositions of
law laid down in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal.
(Western Lithograph Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 11
Ca1.2d 156, 167-168 [78 P.2d 731; 117 A.L.R. 838] ; Bohn v.
Bohn, 164 Cal. 532, 537-538 {129 P. 981).)1 In Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 [60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125
A.L.R. 1368], the United States Supreme Court said that "It
would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping congressional silence to debar this court from re-examining it.
own doctrines." In the present ease not even the re-examination of this court's own doctrines is involved.
Rules of statutory construction are at best only aids in
ascertaining the legislative purpose. One of those aids has
here been seized upon, in disregard of the plain signposts
within the statute and the basic concepts underlying it, to
establish administratively unworkable conditions, accord unequal treatment to dividends, and open the way to a more extensive deduction than necessary to achieve the legislative
purpose of avoiding double taxation.
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 [66 S.Ct. 826,
90 L.Ed. 1084] directly involved the question whether failure to amend a statute after a judicial construction thereof
constituted congressional adoption of that construction. The
court said: "We conclude that the Schwimmer, Macintosh
and Bland Cases do not state the correct rule of law. We
lIn BOM v. Boh., .tUprG, the court decla.red: "Our further examina·
tion of the ease has led us to the conclusion that the Department opinion
was correct. The principal reason for granting a heanng in Bank was
that, in a ease between the lIllXle parties, presenting precisely the same
issues of fact and law, the distriet court of appeal for the second appellate
distriet had reversed an order like the one here appealed from, and that
a petition to have the appeal transferred to this court for hearing and
determination had been denied. (Boh. v. Boh., 16 Cal.App. 179 [116 P.
568J.) It is, of course, much to be regretted that opposite rulings should
be made in two eases which present identieal questions. But an order of
this court, refusing to transfer a cause after judgment in the distriet court
of appeal, does not adopt the opinion of the appellate court 10 as to give
it, in this court, the authoritative e11'ect which one of our own decisions
would have. Being now convinced that the order appealed from should
be aflirmed, we must 150 declare, even though this view necessarily involves
the conclusion that the earlier appeal should have been transferred to this
court, and thereupon disposed of by a judgment dilfering from that rendered in the district court of appeal. Indeed, believing, u we do, that
the order now under review was properly made, it would be our duty to
affirm it1 even if thiB court had itself, in another case, reversed an ord...
aimilar Uk all respect...
,
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are met, however, with the argument that even though those
eases were wrongly decided, Oongress has adopted the rule
which they announced. The argument runs as follows: Many
dorts were made to amend the law so as to change the rule
announced by those eases; but in every instance the bill died
in committee. Moreover, in 1940 when the New Naturalization Act was pa.CJScd, Oongress reenacted the oath in its preexisting form, though at the same time it made extensive
changes in the requirements and procedure for naturalization. From this it is argued that Oongress adopted and reenacted the rule of the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland
Oases.•••
"It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence
alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law. We do not
think under the circumstances of this legislative history that
we can properly place on the shoulders of Congress the burden
of the Court's own error. The history of the 1940 Aet is at
most equivocal. It contains no affirmative recognition of the
rule of the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland Oases. The
silence of Congress and its inaction are as consistent with a
desire to leave the problem fluid as they are with an adoption
by silence of the rule of those cases." (66 S.Ot. 826, 830.)
The foregoing statement is particularly applicable here,
where it is contended that the silence of the Le",oislature in
1945 establishes the intention of the Legislature that enacted
the provision some eight years previously. even though administrative construction antedating the Green ease and in
contradiction with it was followed by reenactment of the
section without change. It would be as logical to contend that
the Legislature thereby adopted the administrative construetion. Although legislative silence may sometimes give a elue
to legislative intention, it is by no means conclusive. (Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. Oalifornia Emp. Oom., 24 CaI.2d 753, 756758 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405].)
The conclusion that legislative silence constitutes approval
of what the courts have done, as Mr. Justice Rutledge so aptly
stated in his concurring opinion in Cleveland v. United States,
- - U.S. [67 S.Ot. 13, 17, 91 L.Ed. - ] , "must be
derived by a form of negative inference, a process lending
itself to much guesswork."
This view is forcefully amplified in that opinion as follows:
"There are vast differences between legislating by doing
BOthing and leaisIating by positive enactment, both in the
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,processes by which the will of Congress is derived and stated
.and in the clarity and certainty of the expression of its will.
And there are many reasons, other than to indicate approval
of what the courts have done, why Congress may fail to take
affirmative action to repudiate their misconstruction of its
duly adopted laws. Among them may be the sheer pressure
of other and more important business. (See MODre v. Cleveland R. Co. (C.C.A. 6th) 108 F.2d 656, 6S0.) At times political
considerations may work to forbid taking corrective action.
And in such eases, as well as others, there may be a strong and
proper tendency to trust to the courts to correct their own
errors, see Girouard v. United Statu, lUpt"a, as they ought to
do when experience has confirmed or demonstrated the error's

uistenee.
"The danger of imputing to Congress, as a result of its
failure to take positive or affirmative action through normal
legislative processes, ideas entertained by the Court concerning
.Congress' will, is illustrated most dramatically perhaps by the
vacillating and contradictory courses pursued in the Ion!! line
of decisions imputing to 'the silence of Congress' varied effects in commerce clause eases. That danger may be and
often is equally present in others. More often than not the
only safe assumption to make from Congress' inaction is
simply that Congress does not intend to act at all. (Cf. United
8tatu v. American Tf"'UCking Auoe.• 310 U.S. 534, 550 rSO
S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345].) At best the contrary view can
be only an inference, altogether lacking in the normal evidences of legislative intent and often subject to varying views
of that intent. In short, although recognizing that by silence
Congress at times may be taken to acquiesce and thus approve, we should be very sure that, under all the circumstances of a given situation, it has done 80 before we so rule
and thus at once relieve ourselves from and shift to it the
burden of correcting what we have done wrongly. The matter
is particular, not general, notwithstanding earlier exceptional
treatment and more recent tendency. Just as dubious legislative history is at time much overridden, so also is silence or
inaction often mistaken for legislation."
,
!

Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 17,
1947. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a
I~

